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Abstract
Research into violent extremism is lacking integrated theoretical frameworks explaining
individual involvement in politically or religiously motivated violence, resulting in a poor
understanding of causal mechanisms. Building on situational action theory, the current study
moves beyond the dominant risk factor approach and proposes an integrated model for the
explanation of political/religious violence, distinguishing between direct mechanisms and
“causes of the causes.” The model integrates mechanisms from different but complementary
traditions. Following previous work, this study focusses on the causes of the causes influencing
direct key mechanisms, violent extremist propensity, and exposure to violent extremist moral
settings that explain political/religious violence. The theoretical model is tested using structural
equation modelling. The analyses are based on a web survey (N = 6,020) among adolescents
and young adults in Belgium. Results show that violent extremist propensity and exposure to
violent extremist moral settings have direct effects on the likelihood of political/religious
violence. These direct mechanisms are in turn determined by a series of exogenous factors:
perceived injustice and poor social integration. The relationship between perceived injustice
and poor social integration and political/religious violence is further mediated by perceived
alienation, perceived procedural justice, and religious authoritarianism. The implications of
these findings are discussed.
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Introduction  
Violent extremism is a widely discussed topic in both mainstream journals 
and academia and has been high on the international agenda ever since 
the events of 9/11.  Recent events, such as the attack in Paris, the Buddhist 
killing of Muslims in Myanmar, and the growing extreme right violence in 
response to increasing migration, are just some examples that illustrate 
how the dynamics of violent radicalization can have dramatic 
consequences.  Violent extremism can manifest as politically and/or 
religiously motivated violence. 
 
Although considerable research has been conducted on violent extremism, 
the domain is still lacking overarching theoretical frameworks.1  The 
existing theoretical frameworks are somewhat fragmented and poorly 
integrated, and research often does not move beyond the reporting of risk 
and protective factors.2  As a result, the increased attention to violent 
extremism has not resulted in a better understanding of relevant causal 
mechanisms nor has it led to an integration of different explanatory 
levels.3  In criminology, similar concerns have led to a renewed interest in 
the development of cross-level integrated theories that are internally 
coherent and consist of clear, substantive logical argumentation on direct 
and indirect mechanisms in the explanation of (adolescent) offending.4  
We argue that research in the domain of violent extremism will equally 
benefit from theoretical reflections and theoretical reconsiderations of the 
relevant risk factors: It is crucial that scholars ask themselves which risk 
factors should be considered of explanatory value and why (i.e., is there a 
                                                 
1 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science 
Theory,” Journal of Strategic Security 4:4 (2011a): 7-36; Randy Borum, 
“Radicalization Into Violent Extremism: A Review of Conceptual Models and 
Empirical Research,” Journal of Strategic Security 4:4 (2011b): 37-62; Kris 
Christmann, “Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A 
Systematic Review of the Research Evidence,” Youth Justice Board for England and 
Wales, 2012; Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, “Why Conventional 
Wisdom on Radicalization Fails: The Persistence of a Failed Discourse,” International 
Affairs 86:4 (2010): 889-901. 
2 Noémie Bouhana and Per-Olof H. Wikström, “Theorizing Terrorism: Terrorism as 
Moral Action,” University College London, 2008. 
3 Ibid; Per-Olof H. Wikström, “In Search of the Causes and Explanations of Crime,” in 
Roy D. King and Emma Wincup (eds.), Doing Research on Crime and Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Per-Olof H. Wikström, “Explaining Crime as 
Moral Actions,” in Steven Hitlin and Stephen Vaisey (eds.), Handbook of the 
Sociology of Morality (New York: Springer, 2010), 211-239. 
4 Lieven Pauwels and Robert Svensson, “Violent Youth Group Involvement, Self-
reported Offending and Victimization: An Empirical Assessment of an Integrated 
Informal Control/Lifestyle Model,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and 
Research 19:4 (2013): 369-386. 
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mechanism that links the factor with the outcome, and if so, what are the 
contributory intervening mechanisms?).5  
 
In order to take a first step to fill this gap, we propose an integrated 
theoretical framework explaining political/religious violence as the 
behavioral component of violent extremism.6  According to Schmid, 
violent extremism can best be defined as opposing dominant political 
positions and core (social or religious) values of the society it is part of, 
leaving no place for pluralism and always accepting violence as a means to 
achieve the group’s goals.  This can manifest as violent attitudes, violent 
actions (political/religious violence), or both. 7 
 
The integrated model we propose focuses on theoretical integration to 
differentiate between exogenous factors (causes of the causes) and direct 
mechanisms.8  Building on a contemporary integrated theory of crime 
causation, i.e., situational action theory (SAT),9 we integrate mechanisms 
derived from different criminological frameworks and apply these ideas to 
the explanation of political/religious violence.  Our framework integrates 
an explanatory model that is capable of explaining why individuals come 
to see political/religious violence as an action alternative and an 
explanatory model that is capable of explaining why some kinds of 
individuals who see political/religious violence as an action alternative are 
triggered to carry out such actions.  We will refer to these theoretical 
models as the social (developmental) model and the situational model, 
                                                 
5 Deflem, Mathieu, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives 
(Bingley: Emerald Group, 2004). 
6 Pauwels, Lieven, Fabienne Brion, Nele Schils, Julianne Laffineur, Antoinette 
Verhage, Brice De Ruyver, and Marleen Easton, Explaining and Understanding the 
Role of Exposure to New Social Media on Violent Extremism: An Integrative 
Quantitative and Qualitative Approach. (Gent: Academia Press, 2014). 
7 In our integrated framework these violent attitudes are conceptualized as “extremist 
propensity” and political/religious violence is the dependent variable. For some well-
known descriptions of the violent radicalization process leading to violent extremism, 
distinguishing between extremist attitudes or ideas and violent extremist behavior, 
see (among others) McCauley and Moskalenko’s two-pyramid model and 
Moghaddam’s staircase model. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, 
“Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways to Terrorism,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 20:3 (2008): 653-673; Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to 
Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American Psychologist 60:2 (2005): 161-
169; Alex P. Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A 
Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review,” ICC Research Paper (Den Haag: 
International Centre for Counter Terrorism, 2010); Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of 
Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22:4 
(2010): 479-494. 
8 Wilhelm Heitmeyer, “Right-Wing Extremist Violence,” in Wilhem Heitmeyer and 
John Hagan (eds.), International Handbook of Violence Research (New York: 
Springer, 2003), 399-436. 
9 Per-Olof H. Wikström, “Why Crime Happens: A Situational Action Theory,” in 
Gianluca Manzo (ed.), Analytical Sociology: Actions and Networks (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 2014). 
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respectively.  Although different aspects of this integrated model have 
been discussed elsewhere and some hypotheses have been tested, a 
detailed analysis of the full structural equation model has not been 
conducted.10  
 
This study builds upon previous work and provides a detailed analysis, 
focusing on the social (developmental) model and the emergence of 
political/religious violence.  As our model aims to offer a general 
explanation of violent extremism, and political/religious violence more 
specifically, right-wing, left-wing, and Islamist extremism are addressed 
simultaneously.  Also, no further distinction is made between political and 
religious violence as we will define politically and/or religiously motivated 
violence as moral rule breaching as stated in the law, regardless of 
ideological background or motivation.11 
 
In Need of an Integrated Approach to Violent Extremism 
Research on violent radicalization and violent extremism has resulted in a 
long and still expanding list of risk factors possibly leading to violent 
extremism and the use of political/religious violence, depending on the 
individual and the setting.12  However, such a risk factor approach is not 
capable of distinguishing between real causal mechanisms and mere 
correlates, causing confusion about what is and is not of importance.13  
Although risk factors are stable correlates that indicate the possibility of a 
certain outcome, only a number of them can rightly be interpreted as 
directly causal; the majority cannot.  So far, scholars have not been able to 
agree on a general causal model of violent extremism.14  There is 
disagreement on the relative importance of different levels of explanation 
                                                 
10 Schils, Nele, and Lieven Pauwels, “Explaining Violent Extremism for Subgroups by 
Gender and Immigrant Background, Using SAT as a Framework,” Journal of 
Strategic Security 7:3 (2014): 27–47; Pauwels, Lieven, and Nele Schils, “Differential 
Online Exposure to Extremist Content and Political Violence: Testing the Relative 
Strength of Social Learning and Competing Perspectives,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 28:1 (2016):1–29. 
11 See also Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of 
Religious Violence (Oakland: Univeristy of California Press, 2003). Religion can 
provide an identity that is strong and easy to appeal to as well as a specific and unique 
set of transcendent moral justifications and symbols that make violence acceptable 
and therefore possible. However, the goal this violence has to serve is often (socio-) 
political (e.g., a society based on Sharia law) in nature and religious and political 
ideologies are often intertwined (e.g., religious nationalism).  
12 Bjørgo Tore, Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, 
Perpetrators and Responses (Oslo: Ascehoug, 1997); Horgan, John, The Psychology 
of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
13 Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I;” John Horgan, “From Profiles to 
Pathways, from Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalisation into 
Terrorism,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
681:1 (2008): 80-94. 
14 Christmann, “Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism.” 
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(individual and environment); correlation is misinterpreted as causation; 
and causal powers are sometimes ascribed to mere background 
characteristics (e.g., gender, origin, race, etc.).  There is also discussion 
among scholars on distant versus proximate mechanisms.  
 
This situation is almost identical to what can be found in the field of 
criminal and deviant behavior of adolescents,15 which is equally criticized 
for being stuck in a risk factor approach as a consequence of poor 
understanding of causal mechanisms and the lack of integration.16  
Subsequently, in the last fifteen years, there has been a renewed attention 
within criminology to integrated theories that aim at internal coherence 
and clear substantive argumentation on the direct and indirect causes of 
crime.17  Theoretical integration has often been refuted because of the fact 
that different theories were built on different assumptions about social 
order and human nature.  However, most theories of crime causation are 
based on outdated images of human nature (e.g., the nature–nurture 
discussion), and therefore conceptual end-to-end integration between 
various incompatibly labeled theoretical frameworks becomes viable 
again.18  If we focus on complementarity rather than differences between 
competing theories, theoretical integration can be thought of as an 
opportunity to build more comprehensive and solid theories producing 
scientific progress.  
 
We believe integration has merits as long as it is built around an internal 
causal logic, i.e., logically distinguishing between proximate and distant 
factors.  This implicates that it is necessary to gain insight into both the 
direct causes of offending and into the role of exogenous factors or indirect 
                                                 
15 David P. Farrington, “Human Development and Criminal Careers,” in Mike 
McGuire, Robert Morgan, and Ron Rainer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003); David P. Farrington, “Childhood Risk 
Factors and Risk-Focused Prevention,” in Mike McGuire, Robert Morgan, and Ron 
Rainer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (ed. 4) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 602-640.; Loeber, Rolf and David P. Farrington (eds.), 
Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors and Successful Interventions 
(Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998). 
16 Wikström, “In Search of the Causes and Explanations of Crime.” 
17 David P. Farrington, Robert J. Sampson, and Per-Olof H. Wikström, “Integrating 
Individuals and Ecological Aspects of Crime,” Revised papers presented at a 
workshop held in Johannesburg, Sweden, (Stockholm: National Council for Crime 
prevention, 1992); Messner, F. Steven, Marvin D. Krohn, and Allen E. Liska (eds.), 
Theoretical Integration in the Study of Deviance and Crime: Problems and 
Prospects (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); Wikström H. Per-Olof 
and Sampson J. Robert, The Explanation of Crime: Context, Mechanisms and 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
18 Laub John H. and Robert J. Sampson, Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives: 
Delinquent Boys to Age 70 (Harvard: University Press, 2003); Laub John H. and 
Robert J. Sampson, Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning points Through 
Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
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causes (causes of the causes).19  Wikström proposed that such integration 
should be built around a “developed theory of (moral) action through 
which levels of explanation can be integrated and factor’s status as 
potential causes can be assessed.”20 The integrated framework to study 
individual differences in political violence that we propose is built on the 
principle of end-to-end integration.  End-to-end integration entails the 
integration of mechanisms that play a role in different theories so that the 
dependent variables of some theories become the independent variables of 
the integrated theory.21  It draws upon one of the most promising 
etiological theories of our time, the situational action theory,22 and applies 
its philosophy to the explanation of violent extremism, and more 
specifically, to political/religious violence.  
 
Applying the Logic of Situational Action Theory 
Situational action theory (SAT) is a general theory of offending and aims at 
providing fundamental insight into the causal processes (mechanisms) 
leading to acts of crime, or more generally, moral rule breaking.  It is an 
integrative theory, combining contextual and individual theories from 
different traditions.23  
 
SAT is formulated as an “action theory” or an abstract account of what 
moves people to action, or more specifically crime, in certain 
circumstances or situations.  SAT defines crime as acts of breaking moral 
rules as stated in the law.24  Regardless of content, what all crimes have in 
common is that they break the law.  SAT takes the standpoint that this 
process of rule breaking is the same for all crimes, making a general 
explanation of crime possible.  By identifying acts of crime as the breaching 
of moral rules as stated in the criminal law, conceptual discussions 
                                                 
19 Wikström and Sampson, The Explanation of Crime. 
20 Wikström, “In Search of the Causes and Explanations of Crime;” Wikström, 
“Explaining Crime as Moral Actions;” Opp, D. Karl, Theories of Political Protest and 
Social Movements: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Critique and Synthesis (New 
York: Routledge, 2009). 
21Messner, Krohn and Liska, Theoretical Integration in the Study of Deviance and 
Crime. 
22 Wikström, “Explaining Crime as Moral Actions;” Wikström, “Why Crime Happens.” 
23 Recent studies of adolescent offending offered empirical evidence for important 
elements of the theory. See Olena Antonaccio and Charles R. Tittle, “Morality, Self-
Control and Crime,” Criminology 46 (2008): 497-510; Robert Svensson and Dietrich 
Oberwittler, “It’s Not the Time They Spend, It’s What They Do. The Interaction 
Between Delinquent Friends and Unstructured Routine Activity on Delinquency: 
Findings From Two Countries,” Journal of Criminal Justice 38:5 (2010): 1006-1014; 
Per-Olof H. Wikström and Robert Svensson, “Why Are English Youths More Violent 
than Swedish Youths? A Comparative Study of the Role of Crime Propensity, 
Lifestyles and Their Interactions,” European Journal of Criminology 5 (2008): 309-
330. 
24 Wikström, “Explaining Crime as Moral Actions.” 
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become dispensable.  The explanation of crime lies in the question 
regarding why individuals breach moral rules when they know it is against 
the law to do so.  The focus lies on the breaking of the moral rule, and not 
on the moral rule itself.  Moral rules are indeed different in time and place, 
but that is not the issue when general explanations are sought of the 
process of law-breaking.  Therefore, what differs between types of crime is 
not the explanatory process but the content of the offence.  The same is 
true for political/religious violence.   
 
All expressions of political/religious violence refer to the violation of 
criminal law.25  Defining political/religious violence as another form of 
moral rule breaking, as stated in the law, has the advantage that all forms 
of political/religious violence are the same and thus this approach avoids 
conflicting perceptions and definitions.  The focus lies on the fact that the 
moral rule as defined in law is breached and not on the validity of the 
moral rule or the righteousness of breaching it. 26  Furthermore, this 
reasoning provides the possibility of a general explanation of violent 
extremism, focusing on common pathways toward political/religious 
violence.  Whether or not political/religious violence is committed out of 
different ideological or religious motivations, and whether or not the 
violence is perceived as just or not, it is all violence committed to breach 
the existing status quo; likewise, it all involves breaking moral rules as 
stated in the law. 
 
By defining political/religious violence this way, the philosophy of SAT can 
be applied to the explanation of political/religious violence (Figure 1).  
Research into different, and essentially criminological, frameworks has 
already demonstrated their applicability to the explanation of 
political/religious violence.  Using the SAT framework, other frameworks 
can be integrated to explain political/religious violence.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Bouhana and Wikström, “Theorizing Terrorism;” Per-Olof Wikström and Kyle H. 
Treiber, “Violence as Situational Action,” International Journal of Conflict and 
Violence 3:1 (2009): 75-96. 
26 This definition is in line with Schmid who states that to resolve confusion and end 
endless debates on what can and cannot be considered extremist, a benchmark is 
needed, best defined in relation to mainstream political activities and core values or 
moral rules. See Wikström, “Explaining Crime as Moral Actions;” Borum, 
“Radicalization Into Violent Extremism I;” Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-
Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature 
Review;” Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence.  
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Figure 1: The SAT Framework, Which Explains Violent 
Extremism (Political/Religious Violence) 
 
 
The theory is constructed around two main parts:  A situational model and 
a social (developmental) model.27  The situational model focusses on the 
situational mechanism explaining why individuals actually commit acts of 
political/religious violence in a given situation.28   It explains how the 
interaction between individual propensity toward violent extremism and 
exposure to violent extremist moral settings determines a perception-
choice process that can lead to political/religious violence.  Given the 
circumstances, individuals perceive a number of action alternatives and 
choose to carry out one of these alternatives based on their own propensity 
and the characteristics of their setting.  SAT regards elements of, and 
interaction between, propensity and exposure as the direct causes of 
political/religious violence because they initiate the perception-choice 
process and thus can move individuals to carry out acts of 
political/religious violence.29   
 
The social (developmental) model focuses on triggering mechanisms30 and 
explains how individuals develop violent extremist propensities, how 
settings acquire a violent extremist character, and how specific individuals 
become exposed to violent extremist settings.  The exogenous factors 
                                                 
27 Wikström, “Why Crime Happens.” 
28 In SAT, a situation refers to a specific combination of an individual in a certain 
setting.  
29 Wikström, In Search of the Causes and Explanations of Crime; Sedgwick, “The 
Concept of Radicalization.” 
30 More specifically, social and developmental mechanisms. 
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initiating these mechanisms are what criminologists often refer to as the 
“causes of the causes.” 
 
Based on this framework, we developed an integrated model for the 
explanation of violent extremism in the form of politically and/or 
religiously motivated violence (Figure 2).  This model distinguishes 
between the personal and environmental interaction (direct mechanisms) 
on the one hand and triggering mechanisms (causes of the causes) on the 
other hand.  The situational model of the theory has previously been tested 
and the results indicated that the role of exposure to violent extremist 
settings in political/religious violence is strongly conditional on one’s level 
of violent extremist propensity.  This finding holds across groups by 
gender and origin.31  Therefore, the current article focuses on establishing 
the relationship between exogenous factors and violent extremist moral 
beliefs and the ability to exercise self-control on the one hand and the 
mediating role of both dimensions of violent extremist propensity in 
exposure to violent extremist moral settings and self-reported 
political/religious violence on the other hand. 
  
Figure 2: Testable Integrated Model for the Explanation of 
Political/Religious Violence32 
 
 
Elements of the integrated model  
                                                 
31 Schils and Pauwels, “Explaining Violent Extremism for Subgroups by Gender and 
Immigrant Background, Using SAT as a Framework.” 
32 Our model focusses on the explanation of political/religious violence and not on the 
explanation of why individuals join violent extremist groups or movements. It is 
highly plausible that some overlap exists between both explanations, but they 
certainly are different. We refer to the work of Karl-Dieter Opp for a discussion on 
insurgent group activities. Opp’s model has partially inspired us. Opp, Karl-Dieter, 
Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements: A Multidisciplinary 
Introduction, Critique, and Synthesis (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
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Extremist propensity 
Violent extremist propensity refers to the general tendency of individuals 
to support and perceive political/religious violence as a valid action 
alternative.  This is essentially determined by a person’s morality and the 
ability to exercise self-control.33  Violent extremist moral beliefs refer to 
the extent to which individuals hold a positive attitude toward the use of 
violence to obtain political or religious goals. The ability to exercise self-
control refers to one’s ability to resist temptation and provocation and is 
formed by several individual traits, such as impulsiveness, immediate 
gratification, the lack of anger management, and thrill-seeking behavior.34  
Several studies on violent extremism have revealed that thrill-seeking 
behavior is often observed in violent extremists.35  
 
Exposure to violent extremism 
Exposure to violent extremist moral settings can be characterized as the 
time present in settings that are conducive to political/religious violence.36  
Extremist settings make the cultural transmission of violent extremist 
values possible through processes of signaling and social learning.37  A 
setting’s level of violent extremism is determined by the moral rules of the 
setting regarding violent extremism and the use of political/religious 
violence and the enforcement of these rules.38  In SAT, both elements 
should be taken into account; it is the person–moral environment 
interaction that explains crime, and in this case political/religious 
violence.  This has been documented by Schils and Pauwels.39  
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Wikström, “Why Crime Happens.” 
34 Gottfredson Michael R. and Travis Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990); Harold G. Grasmick, Charles R. Title, Robert J. 
Bursik, and Bruce J. Arneklev, “Testing the Core Empirical Implications of 
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s General Theory of Crime,” Journal of Research in Crime 
and Delinquency 30:1 (1993): 5-29; Per-Olof H. Wikström and Kyle Treiber, “The 
Role of Self-Control in Crime Causation Beyond Gottfredson and Hirschi’s General 
Theory of Crime,” European Journal of Criminology 4:2 (2007): 237-264. 
35 Bjørgo, Racist and Right-Wing Violence; Michael King and Donald M. Taylor, “The 
Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Social 
Psychological Evidence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23:4 (2011): 602-622; Jeff 
Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological 
Approaches,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49:1 (2005): 3-42. 
36 Wikström, “Why Crime Happens.” 
37 Ronald L. Akers and Adam Silverman, “Toward a Social Learning Model of Violence 
and Terrorism,” in Margaret A. Zahn, Henry H. Brownstein, and Shelly L. Jackson 
(eds.), Violence, From Theory to Research (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015). 
38 Bouhana and Wikström, “Theorizing Terrorism.” 
39 Schils and Pauwels, “Explaining Violent Extremism for Subgroups by Gender and 
Immigrant Background, Using SAT as a Framework.”   
Schils and Pauwels: Testing a Theoretical Elaboration of Situational Action Theory
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
 81 
 
 
Perceived injustice 
Perceived injustice refers to the feeling of being treated unfairly by society 
in comparison to others.  Agnew’s general theory of strains (GST) argues 
that strain, or negative treatment by others, leads to negative feelings that 
may lead to a number of behavioral, cognitive, and emotional outcomes, 
including violent attitudes and behavior.40  Agnew identifies perceptions 
of injustice and discrimination as important stressors.41  Many theories of 
(violent) extremism refer to perceived injustice as a triggering factor that 
helps to create a cognitive opening, i.e., makes people susceptible to 
violent extremist messages.42  
 
Social integration 
Some factors, such as commitment to school and attachment to parents, 
can reduce the negative outcome of strains.43  Control theories have 
traditionally pointed out the importance of social bonds to society to keep 
individuals from offending.44  The central argument is that individuals 
who have weak ties experience fewer constraints to deviate.  Social bonds 
accumulate over life-domains, and previous research has demonstrated 
the strong cumulative effects of a lack of social bonds.45  Sampson and 
Laub redefined social bonds in terms of social capital.46  They argue that 
the social control following from participation in conventional networks 
and activities protects individuals from committing crime.  Likewise, high 
                                                 
40 Agnew, Robert, Pressured Into Crime: An Overview of General Strain Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Robert Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of 
Terrorism,” Theoretical Criminology 14:2 (2010): 131-153. 
41 Robert Agnew, “A General Strain Theory Approach to Violence” in Margaret A. 
Zahn, Henry H. Brownstein, and Shelly L. Jackson (eds.), Violence: From Theory to 
Research (New York, NY:  Routledge, 2015). 
42 King and Taylor, “The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists;” Clark McCauley 
and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways to 
Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20:3 (2008): 415-433; Collin Mellis, 
“Amsterdam and Radicalization: The Municipal Approach,” Radicalization in a 
Broader Perspective (Den Haag: NCTb, 2007); Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The 
Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American Psychologist 60:2 
(2005): 234-256; Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and 
Radical Islam,” Paper Presented at the Roots of Islamic Radicalism Conference (Yale, 
2004). 
43 Agnew, “A General Strain Theory of Crime;” Merry Morash and Boyongook Moon, 
“Gender Differences in the Effects of Strain on the Delinquency of South Korean 
Youth,” Youth and Society 38:3 (2007): 300-321. 
44 Hirschi, Travis, Causes of Delinquency (Oakland: University of California Press, 
1969); Walter C. Reckless, “New Theory of Delinquency and Crime,” A Fed. Probation 
25:42 (1961). 
45 Terence P. Thornberry, “Toward an Interactional Theory of Delinquency,” 
Criminology 24:4 (1987): 863-887.; Terrence P. Thornberry, “Reflections on the 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Theoretical Integration,” in Steven M. Messner, 
Marvan D. Krohn, and Allen E. Liska, Theoretical Integration in the Study of 
Deviance and Crime: Problems and Prospects (Albany: Sate University of New York 
Press, 1989); Laub and Sampson, Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives. 
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levels of social integration, or strong social bonds with parents and school, 
may decrease the chances of committing political/religious violence. 
  
Perceived alienation (political powerlessness) 
Confronted with perceived injustice (strains) and a lack of social bonds, 
individuals might begin to feel distanced or alienated from society and can 
develop the perception of not belonging.47  In his study on personal 
alienation, Srole describes personal anomia as the individual experience of 
social disconnection and disintegration, which traces its origin to social 
and personality factors. 48  It refers more specifically to a breakdown of the 
individual’s sense of attachment to society.49  Anomic individuals often 
experience feelings of helplessness and powerlessness.  Srole found that 
anomic individuals are more likely to have negative attitudes toward 
outgroups.  Strains and poor social ties can contribute to feelings of 
powerlessness.  Some empirical studies have linked feelings of (political) 
powerlessness to violent extremist ideology.50 
 
Perceived procedural justice and police legitimacy 
Analogous to social bonds theory, procedural justice theory (PJT) 
examines why people conform to the law.51  Just like Laub and Sampson’s 
theory of social capital, PJT accepts the thesis that controls can be 
weakened by structural constraints situated at the institutional level, e.g., 
the unfair treatment of individuals by the police and authorities.  
Perceived procedural justice and legitimacy may well be affected by social 
integration and perceived injustice.  
 
According to PJT, the perception of the legitimacy of the social and 
political system in general, and the authorities that represent that system 
more specifically, depends on the perception of procedural justice based 
on the assessment of the authorities 1) to be just and fair in their decision 
making; and 2) to treat civilians with dignity and respect.52  If so, in 
                                                 
47 Michael J. Mazarr, “The Psychological Sources of Islamic Terrorism,” Policy 
Review 125 (2004): 39-60. 
48 Leo Srole, “Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study,” 
American Sociological Review 21:6 (1956): 709-716. Srole departs form Durkheims’ 
macro-sociological concept of anomy and translates it into a broader concept of 
individual dysfunction and malintegration in social systems. This is in fact more in 
line with Merton’s conceptualization of anomy.  
49 See also MacIver, Robert M, The Ramparts We Guard (London: MacMillan, 1950). 
50 Peer Scheepers, Albert Felling, and Jan Peters, “Anomie, Authoritarianism and 
Ethnocentrism: Update of a Classic Theme and Empirical Test,” Politics & the 
Individual (1992); Roy, “Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: the Power of a 
Narrative.” 
51 Tom R. Tyler, “Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,” Annual 
Review of Psychology 57:1 (2006): 375-400; Tyler Tom R., Why People Obey the 
Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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addition to perceiving the authorities as legitimate and thus to be obeyed, 
individuals will also perceive them as sharing the same norms and 
values.53  Empirical research has shown that those who distrust the 
authorities are more likely to engage in crime and political/religious 
violence.54 
 
Doosje, Loseman, and Van den Bos describe elements of perceived 
alienation and weak perceived legitimacy of authorities as important 
elements of a radical belief system that individuals develop in response to 
certain strains and insecurities, such as perceived injustice.55  In turn, 
these elements influence the individual’s morality concerning violent 
extremism and subsequently the use of political/religious violence.  
 
Religious authoritarianism 
The concept of authoritarianism was developed by Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford as a relatively stable personal 
characteristic resulting from negative experiences during childhood that 
lead to intrapersonal conflict.56  In his view, authoritarian individuals are 
quick to perceive others, especially from other (minority) groups, as weak 
or immoral.57  Following conceptual and operational criticism, Altemeyer 
later conceptualized authoritarianism as a set of coherent learned attitudes 
rather than a stable intrapersonal characteristic.58  The following three 
elements characterize authoritarian individuals: 1) conventionalism; 2) an 
emphasis on hierarchy and submission to authority; and 3) a “law and 
order mentality,” which legitimizes anger and aggression against those 
                                                 
53 Jonathan Jackson, Ben Hough, Mike Myhill, Andy Quinton, and Tom Tyler, “Why 
Do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions,” 
British Journal of Criminology 52:6 (2012): 1051-1071; Tom R. Tyler and Jason 
Sunshine, “Moral Solidarity, Identification with the Community and the Importance 
of Procedural Justice. The Police as Prototypical Representatives of a Group’s Moral 
Values,” Social Psychology Quarterly 66:2 (2003): 153-165. 
54 Pauwels, Brion, Schils, Laffineur, Verhage, De Ruyver, and Easton, Explaining and 
Understanding the Role of Exposure to New Social Media on Violent Extremism; 
Maarten DeWaele and Lieven Pauwels, “Youth Involvement in Politically Motivated 
Violence: Why do Social Integration, Perceived legitimacy and Perceived 
Discrimination Matter?,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 8:1 
(2014):134-153. 
55 Bert-Jan Doosje, Annemarie Loseman, and Kees Van den Bos, “Determinants of the 
Radicalization Process of Islamic Youth in the Netherlands: Personal Uncertainty, 
Perceived Injustice and Perceived Group Threat,” Journal of Social Issues 69:3 
(2009): 586-604. 
56 Adorno Theodor et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1950). 
57 Bernhard Whitley and Stefania Aegisdottir, “The Gender Belief System, 
Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and Heterosexual Attitudes Towards 
Lesbians and Gay Men,” Sex Roles 42:11 (2000): 947-967. 
58 Altemeyer Bob, Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1988); Altemeyer Bob, The 
Authoritarian Specter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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who deviate from social norms.  Research showed that having an 
authoritarian personality is linked to susceptibility to violent extremism, 
especially in the case of right-wing extremism.59  
 
Testable propositions 
In the present study we test the following three specific hypotheses: 
H1: Perceived injustice is indirectly and positively related to 
political/religious violence, violent extremist moral beliefs, and the ability 
to exercise self-control by enhancing feelings of perceived alienation and 
undermining perceptions of procedural justice.  
H2: Social integration is indirectly and negatively related to 
political/religious violence, violent extremist moral beliefs, and the ability 
to exercise self-control preventing perceived alienation and shaping 
perceptions of procedural justice.  
H3: Perceptions of procedural justice, perceived alienation, and 
authoritarianism mediate the relationship between perceived injustice and 
social integration on the one hand and violent extremist beliefs and the 
ability to exercise self-control on the other hand. 
Data & methods 
Data and sample description 
Data were collected using 1) a classic paper-and-pencil survey among 
adolescents in the third cycle of secondary education (ages 16 to 18); and 
2) a web survey among students and young adults who have left school 
(ages 16–24).  The paper-and-pencil study was restricted to Antwerp and 
Liège which, apart from Brussels, are the two largest cities in Belgium (+ 
100,000 inhabitants).  All schools in the third cycle of secondary 
education were contacted in August and September 2012, for a total of 34 
schools in Antwerp and 32 schools in Liège.  Only three schools in 
Antwerp agreed to hand out the survey.  Six additional schools in Antwerp 
and another six in Liège agreed to offer the survey online to their students 
using their online educational platform.  The web survey consists of a self-
administered questionnaire that is conducted online.  Access could be 
gained through a link on the survey’s web page on Facebook between 
                                                 
59 De Waele and Pauwels, “Youth Involvement in Politically Motivated Violence;” De 
Waele Maarten and Lieven Pauwels, “Right-Wing Extremism and the Use of Violence: 
What is the Role of Perceived Injustice and Moral Support?,” in Lieven Pauwels and 
Gert Vermeulen (eds.), Update in De Criminologie VII : Actuele Ontwikkelingen 
Inzake EU-justitiebeleid, Cannabisbeleid, Misdaad En Straf, Jongeren En 
Jeugdzorg, Internationale Vrede, Veiligheid En Gerechtigheid, Gewelddadig 
Extremisme & Private Veiligheid En Zelfregulering (Antwerpen: Maklu), 364-392; 
Victoroff, “The Mind of a Terrorist.” 
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September and December 2012.60  Flyers and posters were distributed in 
faculty and university buildings in Antwerp, Ghent, Louvain la Neuve, and 
Liège; the central faculties and administrational services for students of all 
universities and university colleges of Flanders, Liège, and Louvain la 
Neuve were sent an email invitation with a request to circulate the web 
link to the questionnaire’s Facebook page.  To reach non-studying young 
adults, posters were placed in different strategic places that attract a high 
number of the target population, such as popular pubs and bars, and many 
additional organizations, associations, and local youth clubs were 
contacted with a request to distribute the survey among their members.61  
A total of 6,020 respondents were reached, including 3,653 in Flanders 
and 2,367 in Wallonia.  The average age of the respondents was 20 years.  
The majority was female (64.7%) with a Belgian native background (both 
parents born in Belgium) (76.2%), living in Flanders (60.7%), and self-
reported to be religious (54.6%). 
  
Measurement of Constructs 
Several scale constructs are used to assess the relationship between 
exogenous variables, mediators, and self-reported political/religious 
violence.  Due to the extensive nature of the concepts, only a general 
overview of the scale constructs is presented.62  
 
Dependent Variables 
Political/religious violence (alpha: 0.89) was measured by combining 
items that asked respondents how often, if ever, they have committed acts 
of political/religious violence toward property (e.g., vandalism, throwing 
things at the police, etc.) and items that asked respondents how often, if 
ever, they have committed acts of political/religious violence toward 
persons (e.g., fighting, threatening, etc.).  The first set of items was derived 
from a Belgian study of nonconventional/illegal political participation by 
youth.63  The second set of items was derived from a youth survey 
conducted by the Swedish Council for Crime Prevention.64  As this scale is 
                                                 
60 See facebook.com/radimedonline for the Flemish version and 
facebook.com/radimeducl for the French version.  
61 A more extensive overview of the data gathering process is outlined in Pauwels, 
Brion, Schils, Laffineur, Verhage, De Ruyver, and Easton, Explaining and 
Understanding the Role of Exposure to New Social Media on Violent Extremism. 
62 A detailed overview of the scale constructs will be provided by the authors upon 
request. 
63 Claire Gavray, Bernard Fourrnier, and Michel Born, “Nonconventional/Illegal 
Participation of Male and Female Youths,” Human Affairs 22:3 (2012): 405-418. 
64 Säkerhetspolisen, Valdsam Politisk Extremism: Antidemokratiska Grupperingar 
pa Yttersta Höger- Och Vänsterkanten. Stockholm (Säkerhetspolisen, 2009); 
Wikström, Per-Olof, Dietrich Oberwittler, Kyle Treiber, and Beth Hardie, Breaking 
Rules: The Social and Situational Dynamics of Young People’s Urban Crime (Oxford: 
Oxford Univeristy Press, 2012).  
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9  No. 2
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss2/5
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.2.1491
 86 
 
 
highly skewed, this variable is dichotomized (0 = never committed an act 
of political/religious violence; 1 = committed an act of political/religious 
violence at least once).  
 
Exogenous and Independent Variables 
Independent variables are drawn from the criminological theories that 
were used to construct the integrated model.  Because most variables are 
highly skewed, all variables were dichotomized except for social 
integration and perceived injustice in order to obtain a more accurate 
analysis.  
 
The first set of variables entails the mechanisms that are hypothesized to 
be directly related to political/religious violence.  Violent extremist moral 
beliefs (alpha: 0.92) was measured combining three scales measuring 
support for religious, left-wing, and right-wing violent extremism.  These 
items were originally used in a Dutch survey of attitudes toward violent 
extremism conducted by Doosje, Loseman, and Van den Bos.65  Low 
ability to exercise self-control was measured by combining the following 
two subscales: Impulsiveness (alpha: 0.63) and thrill-seeking behavior 
(alpha: 0.73).  The items for these two scales were taken from the 
attitudinal self-control scale used by Grasmick et al. (1993). Exposure to 
violent extremist moral settings is measured by a combined index of 
active exposure to online violent extremist content entailing online 
extremist communication (alpha: 0.69) and actively searching for online 
extremist contact (0 = does not seek contact with violent extremist 
individuals; 1 = deliberately seeks contact with violent extremist 
individuals).  Exposure to violent extremist moral settings can occur in the 
real world and the virtual world: Violent extremists and terrorist groups 
use the Internet for propaganda and recruitment efforts.66  Social media 
can be especially important since such media 1) make violent extremist 
narratives easily available; and 2) provide the necessary social bonds 
where social learning can occur.67  Empirical research has shown that 
actively and deliberately searching for online violent extremist 
                                                 
65 Doosje, Loseman and Van den Bos, “Determinants of the Radicalization Process.”  
66 Josh Adams and Vincint J. Roscigno, “White Supremacists, Oppositional Culture 
and the World Wide Web,” Social Forces 84:2 (2005): 759-778; Iftekharul Bashar, 
“The Facebook Jihad,” RSIS Commentaries (2012); Deborah Brown and Andrew 
Silke, “The Impact of the Media on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism,” in Andrew 
Silke (ed.), The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2011); Robyn 
Torok, “Make a Bomb in Your Mums Kitchen: Cyber Recruiting and Socialisation of 
‘White Moors’ and ‘Home grown Jihadists,’ Paper presented at the Australian 
Counter Terrorism Conference (Pert Western Australia). 
67 Geoff Dean, Peter Bell, and Jack Newman, “The Dark Side of Social Media: Review 
of Online Terrorism,” Pakistan Journal of Criminology 3:3 (2012): 103-122; Robin L. 
Thompson, “Radicalization and the Use of Social Media,” Journal of Strategic 
Security 4:4 (2011): 167-190.  
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information, as opposed to passive exposure or accidental encounters, is 
especially related to political/religious violence across ideologies.68  
 
Perceived injustice was measured by combining a scale measuring 
perceived personal discrimination (alpha: 0.89), or the feeling of being 
discriminated against by others in society, and perceived group 
discrimination (alpha: 0.95), or the feeling that the group one belongs to is 
discriminated against compared to others groups in society.  The items 
were taken from the study conducted by Doosje, Loseman, and Van den 
Bos.69  Social integration addresses the accumulation of low social ties to 
key institutions.  An overall scale was constructed based on subscales that 
refer to attachment to parents (alpha: 0.84), parental monitoring (alpha: 
0.82), academic orientation (alpha: 0.80), and school integration (alpha: 
0.59).  
 
Finally, a number of variables that are believed to mediate the relationship 
between violent extremist moral beliefs and low self-control on the one 
hand and “causes of the causes” on the other hand are studied.  Religious 
authoritarianism refers to extreme dogmatic views with regard to religion.  
This scale is based on Althemeyer’s authoritarianism scale (alpha: 0.87).70  
Perceived alienation (anomia) is derived from Srole’s study of personal 
alienation (alpha: 0.85).71  The scale has been extensively used in the 
European social survey.  Further, elements of procedural justice are 
included.  The scales for low procedural justice (alpha: 0.84) and 
perceived legitimacy (alpha: 0.80) have previously been used in the 
European Social Survey.72  Perceived personal respect (alpha: 0.86) refers 
to whether or not an individual feels the authorities treat him or her with 
respect and dignity.  The items were taken from Doosje, Loseman, and 
Van den Bos’ study.73 
 
 
Analysis Plan 
Due to the extreme skewness of some variables and detected nonlinearity 
in the data, the dependent variable and independent variables are 
                                                 
68 Pauwels, Brion, Schils, Laffineur, Verhage, De Ruyver, and Easton, Explaining and 
Understanding the Role of Exposure to New Social Media on Violent Extremism. 
69 Doosje, Loseman and Van den Bos, “Determinants of the Radicalization Process.” 
70 Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Specter. 
71 Srole, “Social Integration and Certain Corollaries.” 
72 Mike Hough, Jonathan Jackson, Ben Bradford, Andy Myhill, and Paul Quinton, 
“Procedural Justice, Trust and Institutional Legitimacy,” Policing 4:1 (2010): 203-
2010. The difference between procedural justice and legitimacy is that the justice 
variable refers to people’s overall picture of how citizens are treated by the police, 
while the legitimacy variable refers to the extent to which people perceive the 
authorities as legitimate. 
73 Doosje, Loseman and Van den Bos, “Determinants of the Radicalization Processes.” 
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categorized (median dichotomization) and a log-linear analysis is 
preferred over a linear model.  It should be stressed that the results of this 
operation did not alter any results, but as the effects are strongest in the 
highest category of the variables, it seemed natural to perform a log-linear 
model.  In order to test the integrated model of political/religious violence, 
a series of log-linear path models were run.  Path analyses allow for the 
testing of both direct and indirect effects.  Log-linear path models are 
highly suitable for the analysis of categorical data.74  All analyses were 
performed using MPlus 7.3.  Only the direct effects are presented.  The 
effect parameters are log odds.75  
 
Results 
While different models were run, we have restricted ourselves to the 
presentation of the best fitting model.  The best fitting model has an 
acceptable fit (RMSEA = 0.03).  RMSEA values below 0.05 are considered 
acceptable.  The model is shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 Linda K. Muthén and Bengt O. Muthén, Mplus Statistical Analysis with Latent 
Variables: User’s Guide (Los Angeles, CA: Muthén & Muthén, 2012). 
75 Log odds refer to the changing probability that a subject belongs to a certain category 
(e.g., committing political violence versus not committing political/religious violence). 
It reflects an increase or decrease in odds. A positive value indicates a positive effect, 
while a negative value indicates a negative effect. The interpretation of specific log odds  
can be made easier by conversion to odds ratios.  
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Figure 3: Tested integrated model for the explanation of 
political/religious violence (RMSEA = 0.03) 76 
 
 
 
A low ability to exercise self-control (log odds = 0.35), violent extremist 
moral beliefs (log odds = 0.19), and active exposure to violent extremist 
moral settings (log odds = 0.25) are directly related to political/religious 
violence.  Both dimensions of violent extremist propensity share a number 
of common causes and are still related to each other (0.16).  As SAT (in the 
situational model) does not assume a causal relationship between violent 
extremist beliefs and the ability to exercise self-control with regard to the 
explanation of acts of political/religious violence, we did not draw a causal 
arrow between both constructs.  However, from a developmental point of 
view, an increasing number of scholars seem to point to the fact that the 
ability to exercise self-control is causally related to moral beliefs.77  A low 
ability to exercise self-control (log odds = 0.14) and violent extremist 
moral beliefs (log odds = 0.13) are positively related to exposure to violent 
extremist moral settings.  These results are in line with the key assumption 
of situational action theory, identifying both violent extremist propensity 
                                                 
76 Additional direct paths were found from low legitimacy to active exposure (log odds 
= 0.076) and from low legitimacy to low social control (log odds = 0.096). Since these 
effects are smaller than 0.1, they are negligible and not displayed here.  
77 See contemporary research regarding self-control and offending. Hay, Carter and 
Ryan Meldrum, Self-control and Crime Over the Life Course (Thousand Oaks: SAGE 
Publications, 2015). 
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(low self-control and violent extremist moral beliefs) and (active) exposure 
to violent extremist settings as direct key mechanisms explaining 
political/religious violence.  The interaction between violent extremist 
propensity and exposure is not modeled in the present study as we are 
interested in both dimensions of violent extremist propensity as 
mediators.  However, we have previously demonstrated that the effect of 
exposure to violent extremist moral settings is conditional on one’s level of 
violent extremist propensity.78 
 
In line with our expectations, there is a direct path from perceived 
injustice to perceived alienation (log odds = 0.35), authoritarianism (log 
odds = 0.5), lack of respect (log odds = 0.78), and low legitimacy (log odds 
= 0.13).  However, there is also a direct effect on low self-control (log odds 
= 0.25), violent extremist moral beliefs (log odds = 0.34), and active 
exposure to violent extremist moral settings (log odds = 0.16). 
 
We detected no direct path from social integration to perceived alienation, 
although there is a direct effect on lack of personal respect (log odds = -
0.49) and low procedural justice (log odds = -0.19). We also observe a 
direct path from social integration to low self-control (log odds: -0.56) and 
violent extremist moral beliefs (log odds = -0.14).  
 
Perceived alienation mediates the effects of perceived injustice, and there 
is a direct path to low self-control (log odds = 0.22), violent extremist 
moral beliefs (log odds = 0.19), and low procedural justice (log odds = 
0.25).  Perceived legitimacy translates social integration indirectly into 
political/religious violence through a series of intervening mechanisms: 
There is a direct path from lack of respect to procedural justice (log odds = 
0.45) and low legitimacy (log odds = 0.26), and low procedural justice is 
directly related to low legitimacy (log odds = 0.48).  Low legitimacy is 
directly related to political/religious violence (log odds = 0.14).  This is in 
line with a key assumption of procedural justice theory (Tyler, 2006). 
Finally, authoritarianism is directly related to violent extremist moral 
beliefs (log odds = 0.28), low self-control (log odds = 0.17), and exposure 
to violent extremist moral settings (log odds = 0.15).  
 
Discussion & Conclusion 
These findings demonstrate that political/religious violence directly stems 
from moral violent extremist beliefs, a low ability to exercise self-control, 
and exposure to violent extremist moral settings.  This is in line with SAT.  
The present study was not only interested in the mechanisms that can 
                                                 
78 Pauwels, Brion, Schils, Laffineur, Verhage, De Ruyver, and Easton, Explaining and 
Understanding the Role of Exposure to New Social Media on Violent Extremism.  
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directly affect the likelihood of political/religious violence, but also in the 
“causes of the causes,” which influence these direct mechanisms.  The 
results of this study prove the feasibility and additional value of theoretical 
integration.  By logically integrating different frameworks, a more 
comprehensive explanation of political/religious violence became possible 
by identifying different, but equally valid, causal pathways.  This supports 
our claim that in order to advance research, researchers should move 
beyond vicious debates on which competing theory is wright or wrong and 
instead search for complementarity and integrated models.   
 
We found that perceived injustice and social integration can be seen as 
important factors that indirectly bring about political/religious violence by 
influencing violent extremist moral beliefs and evoking active exposure to 
violent extremist moral settings.  Next to enhancing authoritarianism, 
perceived injustice also strongly affects feelings of perceived alienation.  
Alienation itself is a part of a causal chain as it weakens personal levels of 
self-control, increases violent extremist moral beliefs, and negatively 
influences perceptions of procedural justice.  Together with social 
integration, perceived injustice also increases the feeling that one lacks 
respect.  This lack of respect, together with perceived alienation, leads to 
low procedural justice and eventually the perception of the authorities as 
being illegitimate, not sharing the same values, and thus not to be obeyed.  
This is important since this lack of legitimacy undermines compliance and 
confidence and thus directly enhances the chance of committing 
political/religious violence.79  In short, perceived alienation and perceived 
legitimacy both play a major role in translating experienced strains into 
violent extremist propensity and exposure to violent extremist settings.   
 
Research has often focused on the individual characteristics when 
explaining violent extremism, but ignored the wider circumstances and 
context in which this individual develops.80  So far, socioeconomic 
deprivation has received a lot of attention from researchers without much 
result.  Research trying to uncover socio-demographic profiles of violent 
extremists and terrorists only found mixed and contradicting results.  
Focusing on perceived injustice can put these results in perspective since 
feelings of injustice can be present among all layers of society. The 
perception of injustice by the individual, whether toward himself or the 
group, is what can link more macro-level social facts, such as poverty and 
                                                 
79 Michael D. Reisig, Jason Bratton, and Marc G. Gertz, “The Construct Validity and 
Refinement of Process-based Policing Measures,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 
34:8 (2007): 1005-1028; Tyler, Why People Obey the Law. 
80 Rik Coolsaet, “What Drives Europeans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from the 
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inequality, to individual responses, such as political/religious violence.81 
This means violent extremism cannot be explained by mere socio-
economical characteristics of certain groups or individuals, but is 
ultimately rooted in social conditions that trigger different individual 
characteristics, such as perceptions of injustice, which may in turn trigger 
mechanisms of recalibration.82  This is partially backed up by recent 
research on foreign fighters, which often locates the starting point in 
experiences of strain and feelings of indignation and being lost, resulting 
in personal estrangement from society.83  
 
It would be helpful here to provide some methodological concluding 
remarks.  Our analysis is based on cross-sectional data, providing only a 
snapshot of what is likely to be a complex and interrelated phenomena.  
Although we do consider our results to be useful and of great relevance in 
an otherwise fragmented research field, we must allow for some nuance 
when interpreting the results.  Furthermore, our study looked at right-
wing, left-wing, and Islamic violent extremism simultaneously.  A separate 
test of the model for each of these types of violent extremism is 
recommended to strengthen the general claim of the model.  It is also not 
clear to what extent such a model would be applicable to other types of 
violent extremism, such as single-issue extremism.  In addition, our study 
is limited to the Belgian context.  It is advisable for future research to test 
the model in other social and political contexts.  Future studies should also 
try to uncover the broader social, political, and economic contexts and 
conditions under which feelings of injustice and poor ties to society 
develop.  
 
Finally, the present study has some limitations to take into account. First, 
using this theoretical framework, the variation in political/religious 
violence could only be partially addressed, meaning that the theoretical 
framework is incomplete.  Second, the study relies on cross-sectional data, 
which are not optimal for making causal inferences as causes and effects 
are measured simultaneously.  Future research should consider 
longitudinal designs.  In this respect, much can be learned from gang 
research.84  Third, although the web survey has considerably contributed 
to the survey response, some disadvantages have to be kept in mind.  The 
researcher cannot completely monitor the process of response selection or 
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the conditions under which the questionnaire is completed (the presence 
of others, anonymity, etc.).  It is unclear to what extent our data are biased 
by this method of data collection.85   
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